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Summary:
The purposes of this study were (1) to assess the magnitude of price effects
whenever an electric utility firm faces direct competition from another
electric utility firm and (2) to observe these priced-effects of competition
compared with X-efficiency effects on costs.
The results support the presence of lower prices with competition which
accompany the elimination of X-ef f iciency, as hypothesized by Leibenstein.
However j the results show that firms did not recoup all of the price conces-
sions they granted because of competition. This suggests that firms were
unable to generate sufficiently large cost economies to offset the price
reductions caused by competitive pressure.

COMPETITION, PRICES AND X-EFFICIENCY
By Walter J. Prlmeaux, Jr.
INTRODUCTION
In his most recent contribution to economics, Harvey Leibenstein
points out that regulation of natural monopolies presents very complex
problems which are far from solved. Leibenstein says: "Somehow the
regulatory means must include elements that induce the monopoly to try
to achieve approximately as low levels of X-inefficiency as are achieved,
at least on the average, by competitive industries." He does not embark
upon the very complex task of inventing .regulatory, systems for the regu-
lation of monopolies but he does, recognize the .importance of .the problem
of "natural monopoly". He explains that his analytical apparatus shows
up the inadequate and social wasteful results of current regulation of ...
some monopolies.
Of course in this economy competition usually provides a regulatory
function over prices; and competition's decline in the early history of
the utility industries, caused concern about possible abuses by unregu-
lated monopoly and , this condition generated a climate for the imposition..
of state. regulation, .....
*Jon Nelson, • Robert. Rasche, Patrick Mann, John Mikesell, Julian Simon,
Daniel Hollas, Milton Kafoglis, and John Moorehouse read an earlier ver-
sion and offered suggestions for improvement.
iiarvey Leibenstein, Beyond Economic Man (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1976, pp.. 252-253. i-sortr:. ,.•-..'.
'"''•
2
Ibid., p. 253.
3 *
"
•.' ••
•'• '
Burton N. Behling,, Competition and Monopoly in Public Utility Industries
(Urbana: University of Illinois, 1938, pp. 18-28.
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One important purpose of "natural monopoly" regulation is to con-
trol prices charged for public utility services. Yet very little is
known about the actual effect of commission regulation on the prices
charged for utility services. A previous study assessed the effects
4
of X-inefficiency on electric utility costs but the accompanying price
effects, by using direct competition as a regulator, have not been deter-
mined. This past deficiency was caused largely by the general lack of
knowledge by economists that competition does exist in the electric
utility business and data are available to test the effects of rivalry
in a "natural monopoly" environment. The purposes of this study were
(1) to assess the magnitude of price effects whenever electric utility
firms face direct competition and (2) to observe how these price effects
of competition compared with the X-efficiency effects on costs examined
in a previous study.
The results support the presence of lower prices with competition
which accompany the elimination of X-inefficiency, as hypothesized by
Leibenstein. However, the results show that firms did not recoup all
of the price concessions they granted because of competition. This
suggests that firms were unable to generate sufficiently large cost
economies to offset the price reductions caused by competitive pressure.
Walter J. Priraeaux, Jr. "An Assessment of X-Efficiency Gained Through
Competition," The Review of Economics and Statistics , Vol. LIX, No. 1,
February, 1977.
Walter J. Primeaux, Jr. "A Reexamination of the Monopoly Market Struc-
ture for Electric Utilities," in Promoting Competition in Regulated
Markets
,
Almarin Phillips (ed.) (Washington: The Brookings Institution,
1975, pp. 175-200).
Leibenstein, op_. cit
. , p. 207.
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PREVIOUS STUDIES
Individual studies by several economists have assessed the impact
of competition between natural gas and electricity by examining differences
in economic performance between monopoly electric firms competing with
monopoly gas firms. These results were then compared with combination
firms, that is, those which sell both gas and electricity and do not face
a substitute. These studies are useful and interesting; however, they
have only focused upon the high degree of substitutability of these two
types of energy for some uses as the source of competition among firms
and they are not concerned with the effects of direct competition. More-
over, they were not preceded by studies of X-efficiency and costs, so
these relative effects were not developed or compared.
The effects of direct competition existing between two electric
utility firms in the same city have been generally overlooked by economists.
a
A notable exception is an important study by Richard Hellman. Hellman
examined government competition with privately owned electric firms. He
also presents case studies of a number of cities where direct competition
See: Franklin H. Cook, "Competitive Price Economies of Combination
Utilities," Public Utility Fortnightly , January 19, 1967, LXXIX, pp; -
34-36; Bruce M. Owen, "Monopoly Price in Combined Gas and Electric Utili-
ties," Antitrust Bulletin , May 1970; Irwin M. Stelzer and Bruce C. Netschert,
"Hot War in the Energy Industry," Harvard Business Review , Volume 45, Nov.-
Dec. 1967, pp. 14-26 and 190-92; Joe D. Pace, "The Relative Performance of
Combination Gas Electric Utilities," Antitrust Bulletin , Volume 17, Summer
1972, pp. 519-65; J. W. Wilson, "Residential Demand for Electricity,"
Quarterly Review of Economics and Business , Spring 1971, pp. 7-22; Paul S.
Brandon, •"The Electric
:
Side of Combination Gas-Electric Utilities,"' Bell
Journal of Economics and Management Science , Volume, 2, Number 2, Autumn 1971.
o
Richard Hellman, Government Competition in the Electric Utility
Industry: A Theoretical and Empirical Study (New York: Praeger Publishers)
1972.
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has existed between two electric utility firms. While Hellman's is an
interesting study and does present price comparisons, it does not develop
a rigorous statistical analysis. Therefore, his conclusions regarding
price effects of monopoly vs. competition should be examined more fully.
Moreover, he does not examine X-efficiency effects generated from compe-
tition.
One study examined the average costs of electric utility firms
facing direct competition and concluded that firms facing rivalry ac-
tually operated at lower average costs than monopolists. This study
concluded that average cost is reduced, at the mean, by 10.75% because
of competition. This reflects a quantitative value of the presence of
X-efficiency gained through competition; or the loss caused by the
9
absence of competition in a regulated environment. However, the
price effects of this competition were not developed.
Another study examined price rigidity in this type duopoly but did
not examined price effects of competition or the X-efficiency effects of
this rivalry. 10
While some of the above studies do examine competition in a "natural
monopoly" environment, they are clearly not concerned with the central
issues investigated by this study.
9
"An Assessment of X-Efficiency. .
.
, op . cit .," p. 107.
Walter J. Primeaux, Jr. and Mark R. Bomball, "A Reexamination of the
Kinky Oligopoly Demand Curve," Journal of Political Economy , July/August
1974, pp. 851-862.
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THE THEORY
Residential prices of electricity are affected by a number of var-
iables which can be broadly categorized as demand and cost factors.
The income oJ: the buyer is an Important determinate of consumption
and thus affect price levels. With higher customer incomes, the utility
firm is able to exact higher customer prices for its services.
The price of natural gas should also affect prices charged for elec-
tric services. For many uses, natural gas can be substituted for elec-
tricity; this capability should put downward pressure on electricity
prices
.
The price of electricity should be affected by consumer density in
the service area. Since the number of customers per square mile affects
distribution cost:3, a higher density should be reflected in a lower con-
sumer price and vice versa.
Production costs of the electric utility also affect electricity
prices. Costs of fuel and other production expenses (including purchased
power) would be included in the costing formula used by those responsible
for making the pricing decisions and rate schedules. Higher costs per
kilowatt would obviously result in higher residential prices.
In addition to the production expenses, mentioned above, other op-
erating expenses would also affect price levels because higher expense
levels would causa firms to charge higher prices. These costs would be
also included in the pricing formula used to construct rate schedules.
The composition of customer types should also affect rate schedules.
There is a different cost mix in serving residential consumers compared
-6-
wlth commercial aid industrial consumers. This is an important consider-
ation because tho:ie establishing rate schedules must consider the common
costs associated i;ri.th producing electricity for residential, commercial,
and industrial uses. One would expect the price to be lower as the pro-
portion of residential consumers increases. These results aire supported
by previous research by the author. ' wa
Climatic factors also affect the demand and price of electricity
because seasonal variations cause differences in cooling and heating re-
quirements of customers served by electric firms. These variances affect
capacity costs for' the supplying firms and affect the price schedules.
Competition ::hould also affect electric rates. If the rivalry is
vigorous and if costs are not higher with competition, lower consumer
prices should result. : ' ; ' "'
METHODOLOGY
As mentioned earlier, there is very little discussion of electric
utility duopolies in the literature even though there actually are cities
12
with competing elactric utility firms.
In a study of average costs of firms of the same type in a very
similar sample, the variable for consumption per residential consumer
possessed a larger negative coefficient than the coefficient for commer-
cial and industrial consumption per customer. See "A Reexamination of
the Monopoly Market Structure for Electric Utilities, " op . cit .
12
F. Steward Browi., then Chief, Bureau of Power of the Federal Power
Commis's'ion, revealed in correspondence to the author dated July 29, 1969,
that direct competition between two electric utility firms existed in
forty-riine cities., The data are as of January 1, 1966, for cities with
a population of 2,500 or larger.
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Data from the existing duopoly markets provided the information for
assessing the impact of competition upon price levels charged by electric
utility firms. In the duopoliistically competitive cities, there was
actual duplication of electric facilities. The usual arrangement was
that a privately owned electric firm competed with a municipally owned
firm. Supply conditions were :5uch that the consumer had a choice of being
served by one firm or the othe::. In the Texas and Missouri cities, for
example, a customer could switch from one firm to the other at will. In
Portland, Oregon, on the other hand, new customers could take service
from either company. However, once they had selected a firm they could
not switch from one electric supplier to the other. Cities where terri-
tories are allocated and duplication of facilities does not exist were
13
not included in the study.
It was not possible to obtain data for the individual cities served
by privately owned firms. This difficulty was caused because privately
owned electric utilities do not allocate or report sales and revenue data
according to the individual cities in which they operate; therefore, the
data necessary for an adequate examination of privately owned firms are
not available. Since privately owned firms usually serve several cities
13A case study of competition between two electric firms In a single
city Is presented in Walter J. Prlmeaux, Jr., "A Duopoly in Electricity:
Competition in a 'Natural Monopoly'," The Quarterly Review of Economics
and Business
, Vol. 14, Summer 1974, pp. 65-73.
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and face competition in some communities and not in others, published
14data for privately owned firms are not useful for this study.
For the above reasons, and because privately owned firms are gener-
ally regulated by state regulatory commission, " it was decided to focus
attention on cross section data for two subsets of municipally owned firms,
each firm operating in a different city. Firms in the duopoly subset
established prices in. the face of rivalry, the other group set prices in
a monopoly environment and competition did not affect price levels. Data
from these two subsets of firms would indicate relative price levels of
firms in monopoly and duopolistically competitive markets.
Generally, a "matched" firm without competition was selected for
every firm with competition. The criteria used to select the matched
firms were as follows: First, to the extent possible, the matched firm
should be from the same state as the firm with which it would be paired.
Second, the matched firm should be approximately the same size as the
firm with which it would be paired; if no such firm existed in the rele-
vant state, a larger firm was accepted; competitive firms were never
matched with smaller firms. Third, to the extent possible, types of
14
Price data for block rates of privately owned firms are presented
in Typical Electric Bills (Washington: Federal Power Commission) . How-
ever, operating data published by the Federal Power Commission, which could
be useful for an examination of privately owned firms, are not allocated
to the individual cities in which the firms operate. Thus, they are not
useful in this study.
This analysis does not attempt to answer any questions concerning
the effectiveness of utility regulation. Since municipally owned
utility .prices are controlled, if at all, by some local commission,
regulatory affects are minimized by following this procedure.
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power sources should be identical for both matched firm and the competi-
tive firm.
The matching procedure was used to select a noncompetitive subset
to be compared wi :h the duopolistically competitive subset. The matching
was undertaken because, first, it was thought that it would reduce hetero-
scedasticity arid :he variance in the error term in regressions. Second,
if the matched fi::m was selected from the same state as the firm with
competition, some interstate price differences not picked up by the esti-
mating equations might be eliminated. Third, if the matched firms were
at least as large as the competitive firms, any price differences due to
scale effects not picked up by the estimating equations would tend to bias
the results of th<i analysis in favor of those cities without competition.
Ifi
Hence the results of the study are more conservative. Fourth, if the
types of power sources for the competing and noncompeting firms were
matched, price differences due to supply characteristics which may not
have been picked up by the estimating equations would tend to be eliminated,
It was not possible to adhere to the guidelines for matching firms in
all cases. Munic:Lpally owned firms from the cities listed in column one of
Table 1 filed F.P..C. reports and operating data are published in Statistics
of Publicly Owned Electric Utilities in the United States . These firms
1 ft
In some cases the bases of the matching were more important in the
"A Reexamination of the Monopoly Market Structure" study than in this
paper. The sample in this investigation is not identical to that in that
study; however, the same basic sample was used. It was necessary to elim-
inate some firms contained in that study, because data were not available
for the variables used in this analysis. The unmatched data in Table 1
resulted from the elimination of some firms for reasons mentioned above
but retaining the matched city.
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constitute the subset of competing ei.ectric enterprises. Other competing
publicly owned firms were eliminated because data were not available.
Data from 1967 were used because a previous study indicated that this
18
was a stable year for making comparisons; moreover, it was feared that
more recent "data may have been affec :ed by inflation.
Column two of Table 1 presents :he cities from which the matched
municipally owned monopoly firms Here selected. As indicated, it was not
always possible to select matched firms from the same state for all com-
peting electric companies. Table 1 also presents the relative size of
the firms in terms of kilowatt-hour sales. The crucial matching test with
respect to size involved the sales vslume (annual KWH) of the competitive
and noncompetitive firms.
THE REGRESSION MODELS
Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis was used to examine the
effects of competition and monopoly on residential prices of firms included
in the sample. Price functions were specified for residential prices.
These equations made possible the assessment of the effect of market struc-
ture differences on prices of electricity.
17
Lincoln, Nebraska, and Hagerstown, Maryland are included in the
sample even though competition did not exist in those cities in 1967. This
was justified because it was believed that any competitive effects would
have continued to that year. Hagerstown prevented customers from switching
to the competitive firm as of September, 1967. Competition terminated in
Lincoln, Nebraska in 1965. The inclusion of all competitive firms would
have required the use of unpublished data which the F.P.C. considered too
incomplete to justify publication.
18
Patrick C. Mann and John L. Mikesell, "Tax Payments and Electric
Utility Prices," The Southern Economic Journal
,
July, 1971, p. 71.
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The price schedules for firms selling to residential consumers are
determined by demand variables, as well as cost conditions, faced by the
selling firms. The specification of the residential price function is a
reduced form equation:
P = A + B, INCOME + B.2RES + B,EXKVH + B.PRCOST + B.CLTMI
1 2 3 4 ;>
+ B,CLIMII + B-.CLIMIII + B oDC0M + B.GAS + B, .DENSITY6 7 8 9 10
Where all variables are in linear form and P, the dependent variable, is a
price variable which consists of several different definitions, depending
upon the equation specified.
Price Variables (Dependent Variables)
MP. = Marginal price between the 250 KWH typical electric bills
rate and the 500 KWR typical electric bills rate.
MP = Marginal price between the 500 KWH typical electric bills
rate and the 750 KWH typical electric bills rate.
MP = Marginal price between the 750 KWH typical electric bills
rate and the 1000 KWH typical electric bills rate.
Y = Average residential price; sales revenue/KWH sold.
Cost and Demand Variables (Independent Variables)
INCOME = Mean county estimated buying income per household.
GAS = Average gas price-state.
DENSITY = Number of customers per square mile.
%RES = Ratio of total residential sales to total commercial
and industrial sales.
EXKWH = Operating and maintenance expense per KWH.
-12-
PRCOST = Production expenses per KWH.
CLIMI = A regional climatic dummy variable for the corn belt
19
area.
CLIMII «= A regional climatic dummy variable for the Dakota-New
England area.
CLIMIII = A regional climatic dummy variable for the humid North-
west area.
DCOM = The dummy variable, 1 if duopoly, if monopoly.
•'
.
t
Data sources and a more extensive discussion of the variables are
presented in the Appendix. As developed in the theory section, the coef-
ficient on the %RES variable and the DENSITY variable should be negative
and the coefficient on all other variables except DCOM should be positive.
The appropriate sign for the climatic dummy variables is not obvious. The
omitted dummy variable is for the cotton belt, so the signs on these dummy
variables would reflect relative price levels with those in the cotton
belt climatic region.
The appropriate sign on the competition dummy variable is also not
obvious. If competition causes lower electricity prices the sign should
be negative; however, if competition results in higher electricity prices,
the sign should be positive.
RESULTS
The residential equations were estimated by using cross section data
as outlined in the earlier section on methodology.
19A more detailed description of the climatic variables is presented
in the Appendix.
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Table 2 shows the best specification of the equations using either
20
the average price or marginal prices as the dependent variables. T
statistics appear in parentheses below the coefficients in Table 2 and
the equations are in linear form. The signs for all variables included
in the four equations in Table 2 conform to expectations.
Interestingly, the signs of the coefficients of the competition
dummy variable for the equations in Table 2 are all negative indicating
that competition caused the price of residential electricity to be lower
with competition, regardless of whether a marginal or average price var-
iable is used as the dependent variable.
The coefficient on the competition dummy variable for the MP price
is negative but not statistically significant; however, the coefficient
on the competition dummy variable fcr the MP„, MP„ and Y- prices are all
—2
negative and statistically significant. The low R and the insignificant
t statistics or. the competition dummy variable in the MP- equation in
Table 2 probably reveal that for small blocks of consumpt^^^ " J -.„!
cost variables are less important than social considerations in establish-
ing electricity prices.
The four equations in Tabl^ 2 reflect that the impact of competition
on residential electricity prices is quite significant. As mentioned
20
The GAS variable and TENSITY variable were not statistically sig-
nificant and did not increase th. explained variance when they were in-
cluded in the equation. Density effects were actually picked up in the
interaction variable, see footnote 16.
The gas price data were state average prices. Since the sample in-
cluded a larger number of relatively small cities, it was impossible to
obtain gas price data for those individual cities. Perhaps this explains
why the gas variable was unimportant and frequently had the wrong sign
on the coefficient.
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earlier the marginal price of moving from the 250 KWH block to the 500
KWH block (MP-^) is statistically insignificant. However, the marginal
price of moving from the 500 KITH block to the 750 KWH block (MP2 ) is
lowered by $1.34 because of competition and the marginal price of moving
from the 750 KWH block to the 1000 KWH block (MPJ is lowered by $2.25.
The average price (average revenue) is lowered by $6.3133 per 1000 KWH
1 21because of competition. Ac mean prices for the sample, these decreases
amount to sixteen percent and nineteen percent respectively for the mar-
ginal price. The average price (Y ) was lowered by thirty-three percent.
Interaction variables were used to determine whether the effect of
competition had influenced the slope coefficients of the economic vari-
ables. These variables were constructed by multiplying the competition
dummy variable by the economic variables in the equation.
Only the interaction variable (%RES*D) constructed by multiplying
the competition dummy variable by the %RES variable was statistically sig-
nificant indicating that only the slope coefficient of that variable was
affected by competition. Table 3 presents the statistics necessary to
test the hypothesis that all coefficients of the interaction variables
were zero, except the variable for %RES. The results show that the
To ensure that the results were not caused by the inclusion of
very large firms not facing competition, the equations were reestimated
excluding the four monopoly cities considerably above mean size. No im-
portant differences appeared. The signs on all variables were consistent
with those in equations including the whole sample. The effects of the
elimination of these observations on the competition dummy variable were
very slight. The MP- price was lowered by $1.59 instead of $1.34; the
MP_ price was lowered by $2.36 instead of $2.25; and the Y price was
lowered by $7.17 instead of $6.31. Consequently, inclusion of the four
largest cities did not bias the results in favor of competition; indeed,
the effect was the other way around.
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hypothesis cannot be rejected (that is, the calculated F value of .18797
is less than the F-table value for 27 degrees of freedom in the denominator
and 3 degrees of freedom in the numerator). Thus it was necessary to
modify the basic equation only by adding the %RES*D interaction variable
to reflect the effects on price of competition. As mentioned earlier, the
competition dunmy variable was not affected by competition for the MP.
equation; all interaction variables in the equation for this price vari-
able were similarly unaffected by competition.
The change in slope coefficients for all but equation (1) in Table
2 indicates that price is affected by market structure differences because
of some characteristic which is different in the competitive subset of
firms compared with the monopoly subset. This change reflects the in-
creased distribution costs of residential consumer sales with competition.
This effect is due to the lower customer density with competition which
causes upward pressure on costs and prices as utility firms must provide
distribution facilities through a given area to serve fewer customers
22
than if monopoly existed.
The change in the slope coefficient of the %RES variable reveals that
for the duopoly firms 5 price tends to be higher as the ratio of total
residential sales to total commercial and industrial sales increases.
22
As mentioned in footnote 14, the DENSITY variable, reflecting the
number of customers served per square mile, was used in the equation
to pick up the effects on price of density differences. However, this
variable did not add the explained variance because this difference be-
tween the two sample subsets is reflected in the interaction variable.
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Computations show that the duopoly price is lower as long as the ratio is
ji .43 for the MP- price. The duopoly price will also be lower than the
monopoly price as long as the ratio of total residential sales to total
commercial and industrial sales is <_ .42 for the MP~ price. The average
price, Y
1
, will be lower under duopoly than under monopoly as long as
the ratio is <_ .45.
CONCLUSIONS
Prices of electricity are lower with competition than in a monopoly
market structure. These price differences are substantial. The marginal
price between the 500 and 750 KWH blocks is lower by sixteen percent because
of competition; the marginal price between the 750 and 1000 KWH blocks is
lower by nineteen percent because of competition; and the average price
(average revenue) is lower by thirty-three percent because of competition.
These results provide a measure of the effect of monopoly on the prices
consumers pay and an assessment of the effect of competition as a regula-
tor of utility rates.
These results also call for' a reexamination of the natural monopoly
argument for protection of electric utilities from competition. Funda-
mental arguments for providing electric utilities with monopoly terri-
tories include the proposition that public utility competition results
in higher costs of providing services and higher consumer prices. The
above analysis shows lower prices rather than higher prices with competi-
23
tion. ' Although there are other, less objectionable reasons why
"A Reexamination of the Monopoly Market Structure," op_. cit . , found
lower costs with competition.
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electric utilities are not permitted to compete, closer examination may
show that they too may really be unimportant. At any rate, it seems that
the natural monopoly concept should be reevaluated.
These results also provide some interesting insight into firm
adjustments to competition both on the price and on the cost side of
their business. Electric utility firms facing competition were forced
to lower prices to increase or maintain their market shares in the
face of prospects that consumers will transfer their business to rivals
24
unless the offering price is competitive. At mean prices, these de-
creases amounted to sixteen percent (MP~), nineteen percent (MP_) and
... 25thirty-three percent (average price Y ). In contrast, a previous study
revealed that for a very similar sample average cost is reduced at the
mean by 10.75 percent because of the elimination of X-inefficiency through
26
competition. These results show that firms were unable to recoup all
of the price concessions they were forced to grant because of competition;
indeed the necessary price concessions exceeded the benefits gained
through increased efficiency by a rather wide margin.
24
This is consistent with the more extensive discussion in Leibenstein
op. cit., p. 207.
25
See footnote 16.
26
"An Assessment of X-Efficiency.
..
, op . cit
.
," p. 107.
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APPENDIX
Sources of Data
Price Variables
Data for marginal prices were obtained from Typical Electric Bills
(Washington: Federal Power Commission, 1967)
.
Marginal prices were computed by taking the difference between one
rate block and the next largest rate block. The marginal price, therefore,
is the price of moving into the next rate category.
The average price or average revenue data were taken from Statistics
of Publicly Owned Electric Utilities (Washington: Federal Power Commis-
sion, 1967). The average price data were computed by dividing total resi-
dential dollar sales by the number of KWH sold to residential consumers.
Cost and Demand Variables
Data for the INCOME variable are the estimated mean buying income
per household—county average. These data are from Sales Management
,
Survey of Buying Power , 1968.
The GAS price variable data were taken from Gas Facts , 1968. The
variable was constructed by dividing state total gas sales by MCF sales
to obtain an average price per MCF. Data for individual cities included
in the sample were unavailable.
The DENSITY variable was constructed by dividing the number of square
miles in each city into the number of residential customers served by
each firm. Land area in square miles was taken from the U. S. Department
of Commerce, Area Measurement Reports , various years. Numbers of customers
were taken from Statistics of Publicly Owned Electric Utilities in the U.S.
-19-
The %RES variable is the ratio of total KWH sales made to residential
consumers. Data aire from Statistics of Publicly Owned Electric Utilities
in the U.S.
The EXKWH var:lable is operating and maintenance expense per KWH.
Data are from Statistics of Publicly Owned Electric Utilities in the U.S.
The PRCOST variable represents production expense per KWH. This
cost includes purcliased power costs, in addition to production expense.
Data are from Statistics of Publicly Owned Electric Utilities in the U.S.
The climatic dummy variables group firms in the sample from similar
climatic areas. Die Dakota-New England Area: Winters very cold and
snowy, summer mild and rainy. The Corn Belt Area: Winters - moderately
cold and snowy, suiamers hot and rainy. The Cotton Belt: Winters - cool
and rainy, summers hot and rainy. The Humid Northwest: Winters - cool
and rainy, summers mild and rainy. These classifications are taken from
World Book Encyclopedia (Chicago: Field Enterprises, 1950), Vol. ..17,
p. 8294. A map delineates the various climatic areas of the U.S.} for
this study, only tie above areas are relevant.
M/C/48
TABLE 1
CITIES FROM WHICH MUNICIPALLY OWNED ELECTRIC
UTILITIES WERE SELECTED FOR THE STUDY
(SIZE IN TERMS OF THOUSANDS KWH SOLD-1967) S
CITIES WITH COMPETITION KWH SALES
Bessemer, Alabama 96,897
Tarrant City, Alabama 57,014
Fort Wayne, Indiana 301,026
Maquoketa, Iowa 16,531
Hagerstovn, Maryland 102,330
Allegan, Michigan 15,775
Bay City, Michigan 92,518
Dowagiac, Michigan
,
Ferrysburg, Michigan
20,964
130,620
Traverse City, Michigan 64,094
Kennett, Missouri 34,281
Poplar Bluff, Missouri 58,362
Trenton, Missouri 24,699
Lincoln, Nebraska 124,026°
Cleveland, Ohio 521,191
Columbus , Ohio 166,771
Piqua, Ohio 121,818
Springfield, Oregon 166,103
Greer, South Carolina 42,931
MATCHED CITIES-
WITHOUT COMPETITION KWH SALES
Garland, Texas 303,914
Florence, Alabama 408,069
Scottsboro, Alabama 81,784
Richmond, Indiana 357,959
Algona, Iowa 25,940
Bristol, Virginia 196,344
Niles, Michigan 59,974
Wyandotte, Michigan 108,391
Hillsdale, Michigan 63,027
Lansing, Michigan 1,179,935
Sturgis, Michigan 66,935
Petoskey, Michigan 28,463
Rolla, Missouri 45,201
Omaha, Nebraska 2,343,826
Springfield, Illinois 501,079
Logansport, Indiana 119,687
Eugene, Oregon 1,123,796
Greenwood, South Carolina 67,829
Watertown, South Dakota 53,944
San Antonio, Texas 2,913,818
Springfield, Missouri 583,488
Statistics of Publicly Owned Electric Utilities in the United States (Washington:
Federal Power Commission, 1967). Data for municipally owned firms in each city were
for the year 1967, unless other years are indicated.
This city is served by Grand Haven Board of Light and Power and Consumers Power
Company.
'Competition terminated in 1965, therefore, 1965 sales were used for matching cities.
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TABLE 3
F-TEST STATISTICS OF CROSS SECTION DATA
WITH INTERACTION VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION
Mean Sum of
Standard Degrees of Square Squared
Regression Error Freedom Error Residuals
Equation 2 in
Table 2, including
all interaction
variables .73700 27 .54317 14.6657
Equation 2 in
Table 2, including
only %RES*D
interaction ,70644 30 .49906 14.9720
Difference .3063
F =
c
,3063
.54317 3ES7 " ' 18797 < F27 (.01) ; 4.60
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